Thursday, June 26, 2008

Japanese Firearms






At Nagashino in 1575, Oda Nobunaga’s ranks of arquebusiers fired rotating volleys to decimate the charge of his opponent Takeda Katsuyori. Those of Takeda’s horsemen who reached Oda’s lines were held off by pikes, in an echo of European tactics of the era.


In Japan, the Onin Wars of 1467–76 had set in train a period of political fragmentation when local warlords, the daimyo, built up independent domains. The first arquebuses were introduced in Japan in 1543 by Portuguese traders (Fernão Mendes Pinto), who landed by accident on Tanegashima, an island south of Kyūshū in the region controlled by the Shimazu clan. By 1550, copies of the Portuguese arquebus were being produced in large quantities, and they were often seen on the battlefields all over Japan.


Units of musketeers (teppotai) played a crucial role in the unification of Japan under Oda Nobunaga, who captured the royal capital of Kyoto in 1568 and conquered most of Japan before his death in 1582. During this campaign, Nobunaga employed 3000 arquebuses in a field battle, protected by field fortifications. Lord Oda Nobunaga placed three lines of ashigaru armed with these weapons behind wooden palisades and prepared for the cavalry charge of his opponent.


Battles in Japan at this time became more similar to the pitched encounters of European armies than the challenge and counterchallenge of elite samurai warriors that characterized earlier warfare there. Japanese armies showed considerable technical and tactical ingenuity; at Osaka in 1576, Nobunaga had seven ships constructed, shielded by armed plates, which were armed with canons and muskets, creating a very early version of an ironclad; while at Nagashina in 1575, Nobunaga’s musketeers fired in ranks in rotation, some years before the practice became established in Europe. The three-line method allowed two lines to reload while the other would fire. Such tactics allowed a balance of mass firepower to compensate for poor accuracy with a reasonable rate of fire.


Yet the final unification of Japan under the Tokugawa after 1600 meant that military conflict, and with it the impetus for technical development, declined. Already in 1588, the “Sword-hunt Edict” had ordered the confiscation of all weapons held in private hands, including firearms, contributing to a demilitarization that would leave it ill-equipped to face western intruders in the 19th century. It is one of the most effective examples of disarmament and voluntary renunciation of technology.


Matchlocks


The first improvement to this simple design, which created the matchlock, saw the addition of a serpentine (so-called because it was S-shaped and resembled a snake) which held a length of string (or “slow-match”), treated with saltpeter to keep it alight. The serpentine was pivoted around its center; pulling back on its lower arm pushed its upper arm forward, touching the glowing end of the string into the priming powder. The latter lay in a pan outside the barrel, but was connected to the main charge of powder and ball by a touch-hole. The chief advantage of this design was that one man could use it on his own. A trigger was added later, to act upon 14 the serpentine by way of a connecting sear, along with a spring that held the match off the pan until positive pressure was applied to the trigger. A version was also produced in which the spring worked the other way (when the sear was released, it propelled the match forward)—but the impact often extinguished the match.


Despite various improvements, however, the matchlock remained a cumbersome and unpredictable device. Far more reliable was the wheellock, invented around 1500, which used a wheel turned by a coiled spring to strike sparks from pyrites into the pan. Though complicated, it made it possible for the gun to be used one-handed and for it to be held ready for use.


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Army Firetruck (Opel Blitz)






Calibre 35: Army Firetruck Opel Blitz . Great conversion!


During the thirties and forties it became necessary to have mobile fire fighting units available. Prototype TFL 15 is based on our Opel Blitz 3-ton chassis and was produced by various companies. Some of these vehicle had 4-wheel drive. The tank holds 2500 litres per minute. These vehicles, which were originally produced before the war can still be seen in service with only small changes added.


Opel "Blitz" (Kfz.305) (4 x 2) During World War Two the German Army adopted and intensively used many types of cargo truck, but without doubt the three-tone Opel "Blitz" was the most famous of all Wehrmacht vehicles. With more than 100,000 built, these trucks with the Blitz's characteristic lightning emblem on the radiator front panel became symbolic of Germany's conquests. Its tire tracks could be seen in the great city squares of Europe; in the fields of France and also in the endless sands of the African desert; and it even overcame the infamous Russian mud. These trucks had a reputation of hardiness and being easy to repair which made them a legend.


The story of the Opel "Blitz" began in the mid-1930s when the new German National Socialist government instigated a program of economic modernization with a clearly expressed militaristic direction. At this time the American General Motors concern had already owned the Opel factories for ten years and Opel had quickly become a major German car manufacturer, with a great family of different vehicle types. One of their most successful designs was the Opel "Blitz" S whose production started in 1936. When the 'Western dam' construction began, more than 10,000 trucks of different types were involved. It was the original competition for military cargo trucks and the result was that the Opel "Blitz" won. The Opel factory received a massive order for this new standard Wehrmacht vehicle.


The European conflict which started on September 1st, 1939, gathered pace with many fronts opening up, and obviously huge numbers of trucks were needed. Many thousands of civil Opel "Blitz" S produced before the war was drafted into army units. These civil trucks were brought up to army standard Kfz.305 - the official military designation for the Opel "Blitz". In all about 140 different army modifications were installed on the Opel "Blitz" chassis during the war years - they became radio cars, repair stations, fuel trucks, and even some exotic types like mobile laundries or printing-houses. Many other vehicles like staff buses or fire trucks were also based on the Blitz chassis.


From 1937 up to 1944 nearly 140,000 vehicles were built, among them 82,356 standard army Blitz S trucks, 14,122 with a long wheelbase and also 8,363 with a low-level base. In 1942 another famous manufacturers, Daimler Benz AG was involved in Opel "Blitz" license manufacture. Mercedes-built trucks were visually identical to the standard Blitz but had their own designation, Mercedes L701. License production started only in 1944, when the main Opel factory in Russelheim was destroyed by Royal Air Force bombing.


From the first days of war the Opel "Blitz" was very popular in the army. These trucks were integral to the organization of Panzer Divisions but unlike all other German trucks they used gasoline, and tanks used the same fuel. Ground pressure was low and the Blitz could overcome some obstacles which other types, even three-axle trucks, had problems with. Operation and repair in the field was very easy.


The Eastern campaign demonstrated another advantage of the Opel "Blitz", whose gasoline engine could be easily and simply started with boiled water in very cold weather conditions, when diesel-fuelled trucks typically failed. Large numbers of trucks of this type were taken into the Red Army as trophies, and if the condition of the vehicles was satisfactory, they were used without any problem. Some Opel "Blitz"es even took part in Russian-Japanese battles in eastern China in 1945.


This truck became a legend in the army and the absolute favorite among drivers. Some of them were convinced that Germany lost the war because the available quantity of Opel "Blitz"es was too little.


Performances

Length

6020 mm

Width

2125 mm

Height

2520 mm

Full weight

5800 kg

Useful load

up to 4000 kg

Wheelbase

3600 mm

Engine volume

3626 cc

Power

from 64 to 75 hp



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Monday, June 23, 2008

Machines as a Measure of Man - China


A feng shui compass has a lot more information than just the cardinal directions on it.


The three inventions Bacon considered world transformers—paper and printing, the magnetic compass, and gunpowder—were also cited by Karl Marx as the inventions that prefigured capitalist economics. Bacon regarded the origins of these inventions as "obscure and inglorious." They all came from China.


At the beginning of the second millennium A.D., China was an advanced scientific and technological society, and would continue to dominate for another three or four centuries. To a visitor from another continent it might seem that China had invented everything anyone could ever need and beyond. Besides Bacon's big three, other Chinese technological feats included cast iron, porcelain, sternpost rudders for ships, canal lock gates, stirrups and harnesses for horses, fishing reels, hot-air balloons, the seismograph, whiskey, gimbals, the umbrella, crank handles, kites, mechanical clocks, paper money, convertible bank notes, and many agricultural innovations, such as row cultivation, the iron plow, and the seed drill. The Chinese also spun off, with glorious abandon, oddities such as the south-pointing carriage, fantastical fireworks, magic mirrors, and a rocket-propelled toy called an "earth rat."


The invention we most associate with ancient China is gunpowder. In the ninth century A.D., during the Tang dynasty, Chinese priests described a new compound they'd created by combining charcoal, saltpeter, and sulfur in the proper proportions. Long before the first written observations of these investigations, the Taoist alchemists were down in the basement mixing up variations of these ingredients, often blowing themselves to smithereens. Later Taoist literature strongly recommends that investigators not mix these chemicals, especially with arsenic, since some who had done so set their beards on fire, seared their fingers, and burned down the house.


One hypothesis holds that gunpowder was invented by alchemists searching for a drug of deathlessness, or for the metallurgical key to the making (and faking) of gold. One can imagine, wrote Joseph Needham, these alchemical adepts "mixing everything off the shelves in all kinds of permutations and combinations to see what would happen, whether perchance an elixir of life would be formed."


Saltpeter was recognized and isolated at least by A.D. 500. It seemed almost inevitable, wrote Needham, that "the first compounding of an explosive mixture would arise in the course of a systematic exploration of the chemical and pharmaceutical properties of the substance."


In Science Since Babylon, Derek de Solla Price says that while science must follow what seems to be a dictate of nature rather than a property of our mental perspective, technology is an arbitrary property of a civilization. A technology evolves within a culture and its particular demands and preoccupations, intertwined with that society's particular environment. That being so, it is not surprising that the Chinese were the first to invent gunpowder.


The Chinese were fascinated and preoccupied with preparations of perfumes, gases, airborne poisons, noxious bombs, explosions, and flaming eruptions. From the Ch'in and Han dynasties onward (221 B.C.—A.D. 220) they burned incense; fumigated for health reasons, to rid their houses and books of insects and pests; and produced smoke ritually to drive out demon spirits. Smoke, detonations, and loud explosions were intrinsically associated with the spirit world. Militarily, they used toxic smoke screens generated by pumps and furnaces in siege warfare from the fourth century B.C., or perhaps earlier.


The Chinese did (and do) love fireworks, and created them in a huge variety of Catherine wheels, Roman candles, and many other styles. Fireworks flourished at the dynastic courts, with colored lights and balls of flame. Rockets and rocket-composition gunpowder must have been used in these displays as soon as they were discovered.


Around 1040 Tseng Kung-Lang published a gunpowder formula to be used in a variety of weapons, including an incendiary arrow, an incendiary bullet, a burning bomb with a hook to catch on wood, a bomb to be hurled by a trebuchet (a Chinese version of the catapult), and a hand grenade. By the mid—tenth century, the fire lance, or fire spear, had appeared.


The oldest image of a fire lance and a grenade is on a silk banner from Tun-huang from about A.D. 950 now hanging in the Musée Guimet in Paris. The banner depicts the meditating Buddha. Surrounding him are Mara the Tempter and her minions, who hurl things at the Buddha in an attempt to distract him from attaining enlightenment. One of her demons, sporting a headdress of three striking snakes, aims a cylinder from which flames spout forth horizontally. Another is in the act of throwing a weak-casing bomb from which flames are starting to fly.


The fire lance consisted of a tube mounted on the shaft of a lance and filled with a mix of gunpowder, toxic chemicals, lead pellets, and pottery fragments. When ignited it spouted flame and sparks for about five minutes, frying the enemy in streams of fire. Made first from bamboo tubing, the fire lance used homegrown materials. Like the natural abundance of saltpeter in the ground, the plentiful growth of bamboo was a factor in the development of firearms. As a natural tubing, Needham maintains, the stem of the bamboo is the ancestor of all barrel guns and cannons. Later the tube was made of cast iron and bronze.


The fire lance played a large role in the wars between the Sung and the Juchen Tatars from around 1100 onward. By the middle of the thirteenth century, the Sung and Mongols were locked in combat, and by 1230 we find written descriptions of destructive explosions in the campaigns, and accounts of continuing advances in the development of barrel guns and cannons. At first, soldiers held fire lances. The southern Sung made them in much larger diameter, perhaps a foot across, and mounted on legs with wheels. It is with these that the first bronze or iron barrels appeared, using high-nitrate gunpowder and a projectile—a cannonball or bullet—that completely filled the barrel. The true gun or cannon probably appeared in the 1280s, three and a half centuries after the invention of flamethrowers.


By 1288, Chinese soldiers under Mongol command were using weapons that had made the transition from fire lance to gun. A bronze barrel found at a battle site in Manchuria was meant to fit on the end of a wooden shaft. It was designed for an explosion at the base of the barrel, not for slow burning from the barrel mouth. The bronze has thicker walls and a touchhole in the area where the explosion would occur. The thickening of gun barrel walls around the point of the explosion became a distinctive characteristic of Chinese guns. Another prototype, designed for mounting in a fortification, looked like a vase or bottle.


The array of gunpowder weaponry developed by the Chinese starting in the ninth century is of Strangelovian proportions: the "thunderfire whip," a fire lance in the shape of a three-foot-long sword that discharged lead balls the size of coin; the "vast-as-heaven enemy exterminating Yin-Yang shovel," with a broad crescent-shaped blade that emitted poison as well as lead pellets and flames. There was a huge battery of fire lances called "the ingenious mobile ever-victorious poisonfire- rack." Later there came the "cartwheel gun," which had thirty-six barrels radiating from its center like the spokes of a wheel but was small enough that a mule could carry two.


For mortars you had "the flying, smashing, and bursting bombcannon." By the eleventh century there was the "thunderclap bomb," hurled from a trebuchet that terrified enemies' horses while starting fires. Thunderclaps were also made in the form of grenades that could be hurled by hand. A new improved bomb in the twelfth century was the "thundercrash bomb," with an iron casing to cause maximum shrapnel damage. The Chinese were just getting started. They let a thousand bomb varieties bloom: some packed with anti-personnel material, poison bombs, gaseous bombs, bombs filled with human excrement. There was also the "bone-burning and bruising fire-oil magic bomb," the "magic fire meteoric bomb that goes against the wind," the "dropping from- heaven bomb," and the "bees-swarm bomb releasing ten thousand fires."


By 1277 the Chinese had developed land mines; one was called "the ground-thunder explosive camp." Some of the trigger mechanisms of these land mines were kept secret until the seventeenth century. The Fire-Drake Artillery Manual, published in 1412, describes the "submarine dragon-king," a complex wrought-iron sea mine carried on a submerged wooden board. This device for blowing up ships featured a burning joss stick floating above the water that determined the fuse ignition time.


In 1245 Pope Innocent IV sent an ambassador to the great khan's capitol in Mongolia, most likely to check out the fabled firepower the Mongols had picked up from their enemies to the south. Soon thereafter other Europeans visited, including one Willem van Ruysbroeck, a Franciscan who returned to Europe in 1257 and told his associates about gunpowder weapons. The following year, Europeans began experimenting with gunpowder. Other Westerners discovered gunpowder the hard way, in their warring with Islamic nations. In 1249, Crusaders ran into an Islamic counterattack of incendiary devices and grenades in Palestine. The effect was horrific.


The Europeans learned quickly. A picture of the bombard, a small bulbous cannon that fired arrows, appears in a 1327 manuscript, On the Majesty, Wisdom, and Prudence of Kings, in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. Chinese drawings of bombards reveal sets of them mounted on a carriage, similar to the first European ones. Copies? "If so, it would mean the purely propellant phase of gunpowder and shot, [the] culminating stage of all gunpowder uses, was attained in China with bottleshaped bombards before any knowledge of gunpowder itself reached Europe," says Needham. It appears that the entire line of development took place in China first, and passed to Islamic nations and then to Europe. The export of gunpowder and guns to the West led to the utter transformation of Europe.


This was not the first time inventions from China had revolutionized Europe. The widespread use of the Chinese stirrup in the early Middle Ages had given birth to the knight, a warrior now able to stabilize himself on his horse. The advent of gunpowder blew away that knight, perched like a big immobile target on his horse. Gunpowder that could punch holes in the heaviest fortifications signed the death warrant for the castle and Europe's aristocratic military feudalism.


While Europe was broken into hundreds or thousands of small economic and social units, the Chinese usually lived under a powerful centralized administrative authority with close internal commerce and a unified language, writing, and religion. (The operative word is "usually." In between stretches of order, barbarians kept barging in from the north, and there were, according to Alfred Crosby, "periods of godawful instability.") " Maintaining stability required military strength, hydraulic control, transportation systems, a calendar, land measurement, technology, map drawing, palace building, and other construction technologies to display the images of imperial power.


Metallurgy and metal manufacturing was a unifying technology. The Chinese "industrial-dynastic-military complex" was a voracious consumer of iron and steel products. Records from the eleventh century show a single order for nineteen thousand tons of iron just to make coins. The million-men-plus army maintained by the Sungs was a giant maw for iron and steel: two government arsenals manufactured thirty-two thousand suits of armor a year.


A superb bronze and cast-iron metallurgy was part of what the physiologist Jared Diamond calls an autocatalytic process, one that catalyzes itself in a positive-feedback cycle, proceeding ever faster once it is started. Long before iron and bronze casting provided the receptacles for gunpowder weapons, the early mastery of cast iron led to the sharp axes that opened up vast areas to forestry; it provided craftsmen with honed chisels, awls, saws, and other tools of a firmness previously unknown. Cast iron allowed new kinds of construction for buildings and bridges and the hard rotary bits for a deep-drilling industry not seen in the West until the seventeenth century. From around the sixth century B.C., the Chinese were adept in cast-iron forging in special vertical blast furnaces. With the vertical furnace, iron and steel technology in China diverged from that of other regions of the world and followed a unique path.


The Chinese were blessed with clays with high refractory qualities, which they used for the walls of their blast furnaces, thus intensifying the heat. They discovered that phosphorus reduced the temperature at which iron melts. By the fourth century B.C., the Chinese were able to cast iron into ornamental and functional shapes. In the West, blast furnaces are known to have existed in Scandinavia by the late eighth century A.D., but cast iron was not widely available in Europe before 1380. By the third century B.C., the Chinese had discovered annealing (heating then cooling) techniques for making a malleable, nonshattering cast iron. Plowshares could survive hitting large rocks; swords could clang with impunity. So plowshares, longer swords, and even buildings were eventually made of iron. During the Han dynasty (206 B.C.—A.D. 220), iron was of such interest to the officials that in A.D. 119 the rulers nationalized all cast-iron manufacture. During the Han there were forty-six Imperial Iron-Casting Bureaus throughout the country where bureaucrats supervised the mass production of cast-iron goods.


Chinese iron making inspired a continuous stream of inventions. First were the agricultural tools: cast-iron hoes in the sixth century B.C. and a new model in the first century B.C. called the "swan-neck" hoe capable of weeding around plants without damaging them; the moldboard plow was invented in the third century B.C. Called the kuan, it was made of malleable cast iron, with a central ridge ending in a sharp point to cut the soil, and with wings that sloped gently up toward the center to throw the soil off the plow to reduce friction.


Again, the introduction of Chinese iron agricultural tools to the West revolutionized European culture. Intensive hoeing and the iron plow were perhaps the greatest technological advantages China held over the rest of the world. "Nothing underlines the backwardness of the west more than the fact that for thousands of years, millions of human beings plowed the earth in a manner that was so inefficient, so wasteful of effort, and so utterly exhausting, that this deficiency of sensible plowing may rank as mankind's single greatest waste of time and energy," writes sinologist Robert Temple. Throughout the first millennium B.C., the Chinese refined the iron plow. When the newfangled plow (along with the Chinese seed drill) finally arrived in the Netherlands and England in the seventeenth century, it instigated an agricultural revolution.


The Chinese were making steel by the second century B.C., although they were probably not the first civilization to do so. They furthered metallurgical technology with at least two inventions that were to be reinvented centuries later in the West. One is what we call the Bessemer steel process today, invented in England by Sir Henry Bessemer in 1856. Bessemer's work had been anticipated a few years earlier by William Kelly, who brought four Chinese steel experts to a small town near Eddyville, Kentucky, in 1845. The experts taught Kelly the secrets of steel production that had been used in China for more than two thousand years.


In short, the Bessemer process is the removal of carbon from iron. Cast iron is brittle because it contains a large amount of carbon, about 4.5 percent. To get steel, one removes most of the carbon. (For wrought iron, nearly all the carbon is removed.) As carbon is removed, the metal gets more supple. Steel with high carbon is strong but is more brittle than lower-carbon steel. The Chinese used different carbon contents to great effect. For example, the back, blunt edge of a saber might be made of wrought iron, for elasticity, while the cutting edge would made of harder steel. The Chinese removed carbon from cast iron by blowing oxygen on it, a technique similar to the one "discovered" by Henry Bessemer in the nineteenth century. The Chinese technique is described in the classic work Huai Nan Tzu, published in about 120 B.C.


In the fifth century A.D., the Chinese invented another steel manufacturing process, in which cast iron and wrought iron were melted together to yield steel. In the modern world this is called the Siemens process, invented in 1863 in England. The Chinese were doing it fourteen hundred years earlier. It is more properly called the Ch'iwu Huai Wen process, in honor of the metallurgist who made sabers of "over-night iron" by baking wrought and cast iron together for several days and nights.


With a variety of irons and steels of differing hardness and flexibility, the Chinese did more than build spiffy swords. They used wrought iron, for example, to construct the world's first suspension bridges, possibly as early as the first century A.D., using chains of wrought-iron links instead of woven bamboo. By comparison, the first suspension bridge in the West of any size was built in 1809 across the Merrimack River in Massachusetts.


Chinese metallurgical advances made possible a whole range of innovation. In A.D. 976, for example, an engineer named Chang Ssu- Hsun invented the chain drive for use in a large mechanical clock. The Chinese were fascinated with chains and clocks. Since the first century A.D., they had used iron-linked chain pumps and the common sprocket chain to transmit power in clocks and elsewhere.


Chang Ssu-Hsun's successor, the even more famous clockmaker Su Sung, also adopted the chain drive for his huge astronomical clock, in 1090, calling it the "celestial ladder." The first European chain drives were made in the eighteenth century, and in 1897, chain drives became the basis of the bicycle. It is ironic, Temple comments, given that bicycles are a leading form of transportation in China, that only a few Chinese have any idea that the chain drive was a native invention nine hundred years in advance of its application in Europe for the bike.


The first completely printed book is thought to be the Buddhist Diamond Sutra, completed in A.D. 868 and now preserved in perfect condition in the British Museum. A scroll 17.5 feet long and 10.5 inches wide, it contains the text of a Sanskrit work translated into Chinese. There were also large print runs for ordinary books. Calendars and horoscopes were as popular then as now. In fact, so many astrological calendars were being privately printed that in 858 the governor of the Szechwan province tried to ban them. They were sold under the counter in marketplaces before the Board of Astronomers could approve and issue them. The prohibition spurred sales of these calendars, which contained weather forecasts, prophesies for lucky and unlucky days, edifying sayings, and other Farmers' Almanac types of things.


Writing is the unification technology par excellence of civilization. Chinese writing is preserved from the second millennium B.C. but probably began earlier. The Hsia dynasty, c. 2205—1766 B.C. and shrouded in legend, may have had rudiments of literacy. Inscriptions from the Chou dynasty from 1100 to 221 B.C. record the conquest and absorption of non-Chinese-speaking populations by the Chinese states. (Anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss wrote that ancient writing's main function was to "facilitate the enslavement of the other human beings.")


Although writing evolved around the same time in Egypt and Mesopotamia, the Chinese writing of 1300 B.C. had unique signs and principles that lead most scholars to think it evolved independently. The preserved writing of those times consists of religious divination and ritual inscription about dynastic affairs incised into "oracle bones." Before paper's invention, words were written on various materials—on grass stalks by the Egyptians, earthen plates by the Mesopotamians, tree leaves by the Indians, sheep skins by the Europeans, and even on tortoise shells and shoulder blades of oxen by the early Chinese. Then the Chinese invented paper.


The oldest surviving piece of paper in the world comes from a tomb near Sian, in Shensi Province. It was made sometime between 140 and 87 B.C. from pounded and disintegrated hemp fibers.115 From this and other fragmentary evidence it is clear the Chinese knew the general mechanics of papermaking one thousand years or more before the Europeans. (Paper is not that complicated. It's a layer of disintegrated fibers in a watery solution pressed onto a flat mold. The water is drained away, the layer is dried, and you have paper.)


Although most early Chinese paper was made of hemp, in the second century A.D. a court official named Cai Lun produced a new kind of paper from a mix of bark, rags, wheat stalks, and other things. Perhaps the first recycled paper, it was also the first modern paper. It was fairly cheap, thin, light, strong, and suitable for brush strokes. The Chinese also used paper for clothing, shoes, and toilet tissue, which amazed the Europeans when they first saw it. They invented wallpaper, kites, umbrellas, paper money, the paper-folding art of origami, and more. Paper reached India in the seventh century, and the Islamic nations a hundred years later. For five hundred years the Arabs jealously guarded the secret of papermaking from the Europeans, but sold paper to them at a hefty profit. Paper manufacturing did not come to Europe until the thirteenth century, when the Italians took it up.


The beginnings of printing are lost in history. About two thousand years ago in the Western Han dynasty (206 B.C.—A.D. 28), stone-tablet rubbing was the favored way to spread Confucian texts or Buddhist sutras. The practice of block printing began in the Sui dynasty (A.D. 581—618): one engraved writing or pictures on a wooden board, smeared the board with ink, then printed the image on pieces of silk (or, later, paper) page by page. During the Tang dynasty (618—907), the technology spread to Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines.


Block printing was cumbersome, with boards that were sometimes useless after one printing. A single mistake in carving could ruin a whole block. Between 1041 and 1048, Pi Sheng (sometimes called Bi Sheng) invented movable type. He carved single characters on pieces of fine clay as thin as the edge of a copper coin, which he slow-baked until extremely hard. He then set the type in an iron frame and stuck it to an iron plate with a mixture of resin, wax, and paper ash melted over fire. A plate thus prepared could print hundreds or thousands of sheets of paper. Each piece of type could be removed to be used again.


The first record of Bi Sheng's invention is found in the 1086 book Dream Pool Essays by the scientist-encyclopedist Shen Kua. It was not unusual for a chronicler to own fifty thousand books, he wrote. To pub lish books with Chinese characters, a printer might need up to 360,000 pieces of type. In the centuries that followed, the Chinese used wood, enamelware, or metal type more commonly than clay.


The American physicist and essayist Philip Morrison noted in 1974 that when Gutenberg first set the Mainz Bible in print, "Chinese libraries already held editions of printed books older than Gutenberg's product is now." For every Book of Songs or Analects the West has, wrote Morrison, there are ten thousand printed texts from every period of China. The Mongol armies pressing into Russia, Poland, and Hungary in the thirteenth century reached the borders of Germany not long before printing surfaced there. Johannes Gutenberg printed his now famous Bible using movable type in 1456.


Perhaps the non-western world peaked too soon, technologically speaking. By inventing a method of vulcanizing rubber a thousand years before Goodrich or originating the Bessemerizaton of iron a thousand years before Bessemer, these ancient inventors may have given the West a chance to "reinvent" and rename their innovations. Today we view technologically oriented societies as being superior. We see exploration and the ability to conquer as exponents of superiority.


There is an old skit from the TV comedy show Saturday Night Live in which extraterrestrials land their spaceship on earth and demand that humans bow down to them. It becomes quickly apparent that the extraterrestrials are stupid and ignorant. They eventually admit that they didn't invent their spaceship; they found it. Imagine the reaction of the Aztecs to the conquering Spaniards, treating their wounds by pouring hot oil on them and praying, while the "backward" Amerindians used early antibiotics. Cortés and his men had guns; they had found them in China. As New York Times writer Gail Collins put it, "The Chinese . . . had toothpaste, while people in Europe barely had teeth."


The seafaring ways of the Europeans have often been attributed to superior technology, but, in fact, the Chinese invented a staggering number of shipbuilding advances—fore-and-aft rigging, the lateen sail, the sternpost rudder, and watertight bulkheads, to name a few. With those advances and the compass, the Chinese could have theoretically gone anywhere the Europeans did—and long before. Indeed, while Columbus was making the rounds of the courts of Europe seeking funding for his adventures, Chinese maritime technology was advanced enough for Chen Ho, chief admiral and eunuch of the Ming emperor, to send to India and then to East Africa fleets of vessels armed with cannons and manned with thousands of sailors and passengers.


It is this admiral, suggests Alfred Crosby, who should be acknowledged as the greatest explorer in the age of exploration. "If political changes and cultural endogeny had not stifled the ambitions of Chinese sailors," writes Crosby, "then it is likely that history's greatest imperialists would have been far easterners, not Europeans." The Chinese could have made arduous journeys around the world on any seas they wanted, had they had a reason to do so. Western European economies offered nothing China could not acquire much closer to home at much less cost.


So as it happened Chen Ho did not sail east, and Christopher Columbus sailed west, "greedy to find the gold of Cathay and the courts of the Grand Khan as described by his countryman Marco Polo, who had traveled by different means and from the other direction," as the late biologist Stephen Jay Gould put it.


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Fokker E.V/DVIII







Sunday, June 22, 2008

Nazi Era German Wind Tunnels


A World War II–era Messerschmidt Bf-109 airplane undergoes testing in a wind tunnel at Luftfahrtforschungsanstalt Hermann Goering c. 1940


On the outskirts of Braunschweig lay a large area of woodland, surround­ed, in the more open countryside, by a few scattered farm buildings. At least, that is how it appeared to aerial reconnaissance. But this innocuous little corner of Germany was actually something quite different - under­neath the camouflage. This was the Luftfahrtforschungsanstalt Hermann Goring, the Goring Aerial Weapon Establishment, and it was one of the leading centres of top-secret develop­ments. None of the central buildings was visible from the air, as they were all below tree level and the branches of the forest covered them completely. There were at least forty secret weapons establishments in this one unit, most of them devoted to the improvement of armour and the test­ing of ballistic projectiles. A large supersonic wind tunnel was built, and - for topographical reasons - the air intake had to be on open ground. So the German specialists erected a dummy farm-house to occupy the site, complete in every detail; and on one end (where the air intakes were) was a small out-house. Its roof slid sideways in its entirety to reveal the jet ducts when the device was going to be in use, and then they were quietly and unobtrusively slid back again after­wards, leaving the supporting beams standing rather conspicuously along­side. But no-one ever noticed.


And so it was that this immense establishment was erected and kept in full operation throughout the war without anyone knowing about it; two bombs did fall near the site during the entire war, but they were errors on bombing raids aimed at the town nearby.

***

Just before the Nazi seizure of power a corporatist research policy was evident in aviation. All three parts of the research system pursued their own interests. This corporatist research policy is all the more remarkable as at the same time the presidential regime and the rise of National Socialism were wearing away the basis of political corporatism in its liberal variant (cf. Abelshauser 1984). The world economic depression hit the aviation industry particularly hard. Those firms with a weak capital base, which were dependent on demand from the state, had only survived the 1920s thanks to generous public subsidies. When these were cut back as part of the deflation policy of governments after 1929, many companies faced bankruptcy (cf. Budraß 1998: 273–91). The cuts in state development programmes also affected aviation research. The ambitious expansion programme of the DVL was a victim of the Reichssparkommissar (Reich Savings Minister) cuts. The AVA also suffered under the financial crisis. It had to do without the large 6-metre-diameter wind tunnel which had been planned since the middle of the 1920s. However, the idea that aeronautical research was robbed of its chance to develop is exaggerated. In comparison to the existential crisis that was facing industry, research survived the crisis relatively unscathed. Reich subsidies only sank in 1932/3 to 75 per cent of their 1928/9 level. Up to 1931 the level of personnel was actually increased and thereafter redundancies were kept below average (Trischler 1992c: 161–9, and for the following: ibid. 174–206 ).


However, the scientists perceived the policies of the Reich government in a completely different way. They got the impression that the parliamentary democratic state was generally not in a position to meet their demands. Parliament and state bureaucracy seemed to be unable to see the necessity of supporting an improvement of research installations and facilities. Scientists generally tend to judge themselves against their colleagues at home and abroad. The German aeronautical science community looked to America, which since the 1920s had been a shining example of well-equipped and organized research. The German scientists were forced to sit in silence while in Great Britain, France, and particularly in the United States the foundations for excellent research opportunities were laid, while in Germany, working with obsolete equipment, it was hardly possible to conduct model tests on new aircraft types. In consequence, and as a reflection of what was happening in German society as a whole, scientists ceased to accept the Weimar Republic as a valid form of government and began looking for alternatives.


Thus, the destruction of parliamentary democracy by the National Socialists was largely well received in the aeronautical scientific community. With undisguised satisfaction the scientists noted that aeronautics was granted autonomy in the new Third Reich. With the appointments of the former director of Lufthansa, Erhard Milch, to undersecretary and Adolf Baeumker as the head of the research department of the newly formed Reichsluftfahrtministerium (Reich Aviation Ministry, henceforth RLM), hopes increased that the importance of research would finally be recognized by the state. Baeumker had gained the trust of the scientists in the 1920s as the official responsible for aviation research in the Reichsverkehrsministerium (Reich Transport Ministry). The son of a well-known Munich philosophy professor, he seemed to guarantee the autonomy of science and an unbureaucratic approach to new ways of organizing research.


Prandtl and his colleagues were not to be disappointed. Only weeks after the Nazi seizure of power, the AVA got permission to construct the large wind tunnel, a request the centre had petitioned for in vain for almost a decade. The increase of the budget for aviation by more than 40 million Reichsmark from the job-creation programme made it possible for the DVL to carry out plans for expansion which had been gathering dust since the late 1920s. Aeronautical scientists soon discovered that even their most outrageous demands were met. Research installations which had previously been unthinkable were suddenly approved without question. The financing problem, which had always been the limiting factor of research, no longer seemed relevant.


The expansion of the DVL alone consumed over 28 million Reichsmark by the beginning of the Second World War, a huge amount, inconceivable by the standards of the Weimar era. At the outbreak of the war the institute had highly modern research facilities, of which only two of the most spectacular need to be mentioned here. The big wind tunnel opened in 1934, had eliptical dimensions of 5 × 7 or 6 × 8 metres and enabled coolers, transmission, propellors and engine casings of large dimension to be tested. Another technological innovation was the Trudelwindkanal of 1934/5 which was shaped like an enormous egg. In a vertically rising air stream of 4 metres in diameter and 40 m/s hung a model in free movement in front of a camera. The huge dimensions of this wind tunnel were trumpeted by Nazi propaganda. This was the expression of a sort of technological romanticism and the production ethic of National Socialism (cf. Rabinbach 1976; Friemert 1980). The staff of the centre increased threefold within a two-year period. On the eve of the Second World War, the centre had almost 2,000 employees, an expansion in personnel which strained its internal structure. In 1936, the facility was expanded both horizontally and vertically. Between the management and the departments new intermediate hierarchical levels were installed. The autonomy of the departments was cut back, thus enabling the DVL to take on larger projects, so that there was an improvement in the quality as well as the quantity of research.


The AVA in Göttingen expanded just as rapidly. Before the Second World War it looked like a building site. Its new wind tunnel was so enormous that Lufthansa and Luftwaffe pilots used it as an aid to navigation. Hardly was the first cold tunnel for testing icing on highflying aircraft ready than work began on an even bigger icing tunnel. In this tunnel an altitude temperature of minus 60 degrees Celsius und 0.1 bar pressure could be simulated. Its insulation required the entire annual Portuguese cork harvest (Wüst 1982: 33–4). With the purchase of the nearby disused limestone quarry and aircraft hangars including testing equipment, the centre spread right across the middle of Göttingen.


In 1937, after a long, acrimonious debate, the RLM and the Kaiser- Wilhelm-Gesellschaft agreed to make the AVA independent and separate from the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Strömungsforschung. As a terminological compromise the name Aerodynamische Versuchsanstalt in der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft was adopted. In return for generous financial support from the RLM, the centre now had to work exclusively on aeronautics. The staff grew from 80 employees in 1933 to over 450 by 1936, and to approximately 700 in the last year of peace. Albert Betz had to admit that he could no longer run such a rapidly expanding research concern and in 1939 a separate administrator began to work at his side. Within half a year the AVA had changed fundamentally. Out of a straightforward institute of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft there had grown a varied and complex research undertaking. Highly modern research facilities were being used or built. In order to be able to handle the rush of orders from the aircraft industry, the wind tunnels were being used in shifts around the clock. Like the DVL, the AVA corresponded to a large degree in size, structure and working methods to the criteria by which we judge big science. The ministry withdrew the scientific head, Albert Betz, from the administration and replaced him with someone they trusted.


The ‘great scientific expansion’ of the pre-war period (Simon 1947: 24) remained decentralized. Besides the expansion of existing centres, new centres were planned in the mid-1930s. In March 1935, with the proclamation of German air sovereignty, the Nazi government stopped pretending it had no air force (Luftwaffe) and thereby broke the bonds of the Versailles Treaty. The Air Ministry dictated the goal to be attained: Göring’s insistence that ‘German aeronautical research will have to reach the production levels of the leading foreign nations at the latest by 1938 and then take the lead in several important areas’ gave the research department of the RLM new room for manoeuvre. In the internal struggles for power and influence as well as in the negotiations with experts from the military, industry and science, and with competing departments of the polycratic regime, Göring’s stated goal was used as a trump card. The personal support of the second most powerful man in the Nazi regime overcame all those obstacles which faced the research department (Baeumker 1944: 31).


Decentralization remained the characteristic of German aviation research. The effort of the DVL to concentrate everything except the AVA in Berlin-Adlershof would have had many advantages. The building of completely new centres absorbed resources and energies which might have been more effectively used by concentration. The Air Ministry had other concerns, however. The AVA and DVL were reaching their physical limits and could not be protected from enemy air attacks within cities like Berlin or Göttingen. The DVL was anyway considered to be too big to guarantee effective research. A ‘healthy decentralization of research across the whole Reich territory’ would allow cooperation with regional industries and the full exploitation of personnel resources (Baeumker 1944: 43–4). Hence new establishments were set up, among them the Deutsche Forschungsanstalt für Luftfahrt (German Research Establishment for Aviation, henceforth DFL).


Apart from the building of new centres there was a second model for institutional growth. An existing group of researchers could be taken as the core around which a diversified institute was built. A third variant appeared after 1939. Thanks to the Blitzkrieg, Germany gained control of important foreign research centres. The potential of these establishments, among them the Etablissement d’Expériences Techniques des Chalais Meudon near Paris, which housed Europe’s largest wind tunnel, was channelled into the research landscape of Nazi Germany.


The biggest and most important of these new or extended centres was the DFL. Whereas the DVL was devoted to applied research, the DFL was planned as a centre for basic research. A huge research centre shot up on the green fields outside Brunswick. Wind tunnels of various sizes in the classical Göttingen design were added to research instruments that had hitherto not been able to measure the parameters and phenomena in ballistics and aerodynamics. A cross-section wind tunnel, for example, allowed the study of the influence of side winds up to a speed of 200 m/s on flight to be tested (Blenk 1941: 465). Within just a few short years, the DFL grew into an array of highly advanced laboratories and facilities. Adolf Baeumker, head of the Air Ministry’s research department, hit the nail on the head, when in 1942 he stated that the DFL was the largest research project so far realized in Germany (cit. after Trischler 1992a: 174).


The foundation, building and running of the centre in Brunswick were the basic model of research policy in Nazi Germany. The Air Ministry set the long-term goals: accelerated basic research in those areas of use to military aviation like high-speed engine research and weapons. The building of the research centres showed obsessive concern for secrecy and protection against air raids. The setting of the scientific goals, however, was the responsibility of the scientists. The fact that the state controlled the organization of science but not its actual processes meant that scientists enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. The precondition for this cooperation between state and research was the readiness of the scientists to go along with the general political line of the national regime. In fact an analysis of the research work at the DFL shows the high degree to which this new centre fitted in with the rearmament aims of the regime (Trischler 1992c: 213–22).


Even more impressive than the DFL were the regime’s plans for the Luftfahrtforschungsanstalt München (Munich Aeronautical Research Establishment, henceforth LFM). As the Stuttgart aircraft firm of Ernst Heinkel began work on jet engines in 1936, research into engines looked like being taken over by industry. The research centre in Brunswick was still under construction and thus was not able to realize its function of producing new ideas and technical innovations in this revolutionary area of aircraft construction. In the Air Ministry, plans were drawn up for a new research establishment in the south of Germany which was to be dedicated to basic research into jet engines. After the Anschluß with Austria, Munich was chosen as the site. The nearby Ötztal with its natural resource of water power offered favourable conditions for the planned high-speed wind tunnel with a power of 75,000 kW, in which tests on high-performance engines up to flight speeds could be carried out. With tunnels of this size the Nazi regime hoped to compensate for the apparent superiority of the United States in this strategically important technology. But with the outbreak of the war the building of the Munich centre was postponed. In mid-1940, however, the American Congress passed legislation to encourage engine research. The Nazi regime, despite a shortage of capacity, was determined to catch up. New high-speed tunnels with 8 m diameter as well as test beds for rocket and jet engines were conceived and the building of the facility began. Although the construction of the LFM at Ottobrunn near Munich and Ötztal took the lion’s share of the available funds after 1941, the most important projects did not get beyond the basic construction stage before the end of the war. Like a giant shadow – a relic of Nazi giganticism – pieces of the large apparatus stuck out of the idyllic world of the Ötztal (Trischler 1992: 262–9; Hansen 1987: 187–217).

AMX-40


The AMX-40 was a French prototype main battle tank. Its development began in 1983 as a clean sheet design. Four prototypes had been produced by 1986, and the design was offered for export notably to Spain.


The tank was of fairly standard configuration, with the driver at the front, the turret in the center, housing a gunner, commander and loader. With the engine at the rear. It's armament consisted of a 120 millimeter calibre smoothbore gun, with a coaxial 20 millimeter calibre autocannon. The tank was powered by a 1,100 horsepower V12 diesel engine coupled to an automatic transmission.


GENERAL INFORMATION

Designations

AMX-40

Manufacturer(s)

GIAT Industries

Status

Development completed. Not in service or production.

Production Period

1983-1985

Production Quantity

4 prototypes

Type

MBT

Crew

4

Length, overall

10.0m

Length, hull

6.8m

Width, overall

3.36m

Height, overall

3.1m

Combat Weight

43000kg

Unloaded Weight

n/a

Radio, external

n/a

Communication, crew

n/a

FIREPOWER

Main Armament

120mm smoothbore gun

Ammunition Carried

35x120mm

Gun Traverse

360º

Elevation/Depression

n/a

Traverse Rate

n/a

Elevation Rate

n/a

Gun Stabilization

vertical/horizontal

Rangefinder

laser

Night Vision

passive

Auto-Loader

auto-assisted

Secondary Armament

20mm F2 (coaxial); 7.62mm MG (AA)

Ammunition Carried

578x20mm; 2250x7.62mm

MOBILITY CHARACTERISTICS

Engine

Poyaud V12X 12-cylinder diesel

Transmission

ZF

Horsepower

1100hp at 2500rpm

Suspension

torsion bar

Power/Weight Ratio

25hp/t

Track Width

57.0cm

Speed, on road

70km/h

Track Ground Contact

n/a

Fuel Capacity

1100+400 l (1)

Ground Pressure

0.89kg/cm2

Range, on road

600+250km

Gradient

70%

Fuel Consumption

about 180 l/100km

Vertical Obstacle

1.0m

Turning Radius

n/a

Trench Crossing

3.2m

Ground Clearance

0.45m

Fording

1.3m (2)

SURVIVABILITY FEATURES

Smoke Laying

2x3 smoke launchers

NBC Protection

n/a

Armor Details

n/a

NOTES

(1) AMX-40 can carry up to 400 l of addition fuel in two external barrels that may be jettisoned.

(2) Fording depth of 2.3m with preparation; 4.0m with snorkel.


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Northrop XP-79 Flying Ram




The Northrop XP-79 originated in 1942 as an idea by John K. Northrop for a high-speed flying wing fighter aircraft powered by a rocket engine. Near-sonic speeds were envisaged. The idea was somewhat similar to that which eventually produced the Messerschmitt Me 163 rocket-powered interceptor in Germany.


The Northrop fighter project was to be powered by a 2000 pound thrust Aerojet rocket engine, with takeoff assisted by a pair of 1000 pound thrust rocket boosters which would be dropped after takeoff. Northrop proposed that this airplane be flown by a pilot lying prone in the cockpit, since it was hoped that this would reduce strain on the pilot during violent maneuver and would present a minimum silhouette to enemy gunners.


In January of 1943, the USAAF issued a contract for three prototypes under the designation XP-79. The availability of jet engines led to a decision in March to use two Westinghouse 19-B turbojets in the third prototype, which was redesignated XP-79B.


Since the layout of the fighter was so radical, it was thought that test glider prototypes be built to verify the validity of the concept. One of these was designated MX-324, and was fitted with a fixed tricycle landing gear. The MX-324 was towed into the air by a P-38 on July 5, 1944, and became the first American-built rocket-powered aircraft to fly.


Delays in the development of the Aerojet rocket engine caused the USAAF to cancel the two XP-79s, leaving only the XP-79B. The serial number of the XP-79B was 43-52437. The XP-79B was finally ready for flight testing in the summer of 1945. The pilot lay prone in an unpressurized cockpit situated between the two turbojets. The flying wing was of semimonocoque construction and was built largely of magnesium in order to save weight. Instead of conventional ailerons, the wing had air intakes at the tips for lateral control, in much the same manner as the XP-56. The aircraft was equipped with a pair of vertical tails, presaging the MiG-25 and the F-15. The retractable landing gear consisted of four wheels, two each in tandem.


The XP-79B was to use a rather unusual technique for destroying enemy aircraft. The wing leading edge was reinforced so that it could slice off the wings or tails of enemy aircraft by ramming them! And if that didn't work, the XP-79B was equipped with a more conventional armament of four 0.50-inch machine guns in the wing leading edge.


The XP-79B was transferred to Muroc Dry Lake in June of 1945. Flight testing was delayed by problems with bursting tires during ground taxiing trials. On September 12, 1945, test pilot Harry Crosby finally took the XP-79B up in the air for the first time. It flew all right for about fifteen minutes, but the plane then suddenly went into a spin from which it proved impossible to recover. Crosby attempted to parachute to safety, but his chute failed to open and he was killed. The XP-79B impacted in the desert and was destroyed in the resulting fire. Magnesium burns very nicely. :-).


Although the mishap that cost Harry Crosby his life could have been corrected, the USAAF decided to abandon the project.


Specification of the XP-79B:

Powered by a pair of 1365 lb. st. Westinghouse 19B turbojets.

Wingspan was 28 feet, length 14 feet, and height was 7 feet.

Wing area was 278 square feet.

Gross weight was 8669 pounds.

Estimated performance included a maximum speed of 547 mph at 20,000 feet, an initial climb rate of 4000 feet, a service ceiling of 40,000 feet, and a range of 993 miles.

The proposed armament of four 0.50-in machine guns was never fitted.


Sources:

  1. American Combat Planes, Ray Wagner, Third Enlarged Edition, Doubleday, 1982.
  2. The American Fighter, Enzo Angelucci and Peter Bowers, Orion Books, 1987.


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